Although key distribution is arguably the most studied context on which to apply quantum cryptography techniques, message authentication, i.e. certifying the identity of the message originator and the integrity of the message sent, can also benefit from the use of quantum resources. Classically, message authentication can be performed by techniques based on hash functions. However, the security of the resulting protocols depends on the selection of appropriate hash functions, and on the use of long authentication keys. In this paper we propose a quantum authentication procedure that, making use of just one ebit as the authentication key, allows the authentication of binary classical messages in a secure manner.
Introduction
As computer networks spread worldwide with users accessing them via millions of different terminals, information protection becomes more and more relevant. This challenge of providing adequate information protection is closely related to the basic tasks of cryptography: authentication and secrecy [1, 2] . During the last decade it has been shown that information has a physical, not only mathematical, dimension and, as such, can be studied making use of Quantum Theory. This has given birth to the research field known as Quantum Information Theory (QIT) (see, e.g., [3] [4] [5] ). Quantum cryptography, first introduced by Wiesner [6] and Bennett and co-workers [7] , is, with Quantum Computation, one the most remarkable applications of QIT. Security in Quantum Cryptography is based on fundamental properties of Quantum Mechanics, instead of on unproven assumptions concerning the computational complexity of some algorithms (as it is the case of Classical Cryptography), and therefore brings a whole new dimension to security in communications. Over the last few years there have been several experimental demonstrations of the feasibility of Quantum Cryptography [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] which seem to indicate that the prospects its future mainstream use are good.
Quantum Cryptography involves several topics, and although Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) [16] [17] [18] is arguably the most studied one, the necessity to combine QKD protocols with classical authentication methods has motivated recent investigations on the achievement of key verification [19, 20] and user authentication [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] in a quantum-mechanical secure manner. Key verification consists in assuring that the parties of a key-distribution scheme are the legitimate ones, and that the key established is authentic. User authentication (also called user identification) allows a communicator to prove his/her identity, often as the first step to log into a system. One potential insecurity of user authentication consists in assuming that once the log-in process has concluded, the transmission remains authentic for the rest of the communication. This assumption strongly depends on the level of security provided by the channel used. Classical Cryptography solves this weakness employing message authentication codes (MAC), which provide both messenger identification and data integrity. A MAC, also known as a data authentication code, is essentially a scheme in which the sender (Alice) appends a tag to the message in such a way that the recipient (Bob) may verify the tag, and so convince himself about the identity of the sender. This is usually accomplished using universal hash functions with a secret authentication key [27, 28] . Specifically, Alice "hashes" the message and the secret key using a certain type of universal hash function, and then sends to Bob the unencrypted message and the hash. On the reception side, Bob employs the received message and the shared key to verify the hash value. In this scheme security is mainly provided by the selection of the hash function. Robust techniques, those in which the brute-force attack (the forger, Eve, tries every possible key and checks whether the resulting tag coincides or not with the one associated to the message) is the most efficient strategy against a MAC, require the use of long authentication keys. Can QIT improve the security of these classical message authentication techniques? Recently, Barnum [29] has addressed the problem of authenticating quantum messages using a set of quantum error detecting codes. He focused mainly on the use of classical keys. In this paper we show that classical-message authentication can benefit from QIT. Specifically, we show that, even in the case of a one-bit key, which would be trivially attacked by brute-force methods, QIT techniques provide secure quantum authentication.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe a quantum message-authentication protocol. In Section 3 we analyze the security of the protocol against several attacks. First we analyze the forgery of messages. Then we analyze more subtle attacks, in which the eavesdropper has the power to perform a general quantum operation, such as a trace-preserving completely-positive map or a measurement, on the channel. We also discuss in Section 3 how the security of the protocol is modified if the autentication keys are reused. Finally, we present our conclusions in Section 4.
A quantum message-authentication protocol
Suppose Alice needs to send a certified classical message to Bob. The goal is to make Bob confident about the authenticity of the message and sender. The first task consists in assigning a quantum state to each possible classical message. This decision needs no secrecy and can be made openly. We will discuss the simple case of binary messages (one-bit long). Thus, there are only two possible messages, '0' and '1', to which we assign the quantum states |φ 0 and |φ 1 , respectively. In order to guarantee Bob's extraction of information from these states, they cannot be selected arbitrarily, but must be orthogonal, φ i |φ j = δ ij , with i, j ∈ {0, 1}; and must contain, as in any authentication method, some redundant information to be checked by Bob. We will assume that they belong to a two-qubit state space (a four-dimensional Hilbert space) E. As for the secret authentication key, we will assume that Alice and Bob share an "ebit": Each owns one qubit of a public-known singlet state
(|01 AB − |10 AB ). The authentication procedure goes as follows: When Alice wants to send a certified bit i, she prepares two qubits in the state |φ i and performs the following encoding operation on her part of |ψ AB and on the message:
After performing this operation, the state of the global system (Alice+Bob+message) is
Using the density operator formalism, the state of the authenticated message sent by Alice can be obtained from (2) performing the partial trace over the Alice+Bob variables. In density operator terms, this state is given by
where ρ i = |φ i φ i |. On the reception side, Bob decodes the information sent by Alice performing the decoding operation
on his part of |ψ AB and the message received. Finally, Bob performs an orthogonal measurement on the space E. Since this space is four-dimensional, and we have imposed the states |φ 0 and |φ 1 to be orthonormal, we can perform this measurement on the orthonormal set {|φ i ; i = 0, . . . , 3}, where |φ 2 and |φ 3 are two extra orthonormal states. If the result of such a measurement is one of the two first elements of the set, Bob should assume that no tampering has taken place, and therefore obtain the classical message sent to him. If this is not the case, he rejects the message received.
Security analysis
The quantum protocol of the previous section provides perfect deterministic decoding, i.e., the quantum key |φ − AB and the quantum ciphertext ρ ′ uniquely determine the classical message sent, ρ i . This means that the protocol would fail only if Bob accepted a message as an authenticated one when that is not the case (due to the unnoticed action of Eve). In the following discussion we will consider that the quantum channel between Alice and Bob is error-free, and that Eve can: (i) forge a quantum message and sent it to Bob, and (ii) monitor the channel and manipulate the information sent through it. The purpose of this section is to analyze these attacks and obtain the class of unitary operations U that makes them unsuccessful.
Forgery of messages
Assume that Eve can prepare a normalized pure quantum state |ǫ ∈ E and send it to Bob trying to impersonate Alice. In the most general case, this false pure quantum message can be described as |ǫ = 3 i=0 e i |φ i . When Bob receives this quantum message he cannot know that it comes from a forger, so he follows the procedure explained in the previous section: He perfoms a decoding operation and then an orthogonal measurement over the set {|φ i ; i = 0, . . . , 3}. Before this measurement takes place, the state of the message can be described by
, where ρ E = |ǫ ǫ|. As we have seen, Bob rejects the message if the result of his measurement is one of the last two elements of this base; therefore, the probability P f that Eve deceives Alice is:
This quantity depends both on Eve's strategy and on the quantum operation U E . The normalization of |ǫ and the unitarity of U E make the two terms in the right side of (5) both to be less or equal than 0.5. The first term depends entirely on Eve's decision, and, to be 0.5, e 2 and e 3 must be zero. We will assume that Eve somehow has managed to fulfill this condition. Let us focus on the second term, 1/2
First, let us write the matrix representation of U E in the block form
where M i are 2 × 2 complex matrices. With this notation the second term in the right side of (5) can be written as
We can distinguish between two cases:
0 † 0 | = 0, the maximum of (7) is strictly less than 0.5 when |M 0 0 | 2 < 1 and
0 † 0 | = 0, the maximum of (7) is strictly less than 0.5 when
where the real variables x, y and z are |M 0
Note that, in both cases, Alice and Bob can select U E such that its M 0 block makes P f < 1 independently of Eve's choice of |ǫ . Finally, in this subsection we have assumed that Eve can prepare a pure state |ǫ ; however, she could have prepared a general mixed state ρ E = 3 i=0 p i |α i α i |, with
From what we have shown in this subsection, it is straightforward to see that if U E is selected obeying the conditions above, then also in this case P f < 1.
Manipulation of Alice's messages
There is a more subtle family of attacks. Instead of directly forge a quantum message and send it to Bob, Eve could wait for Alice's messages and manipulate them. Eve's goal is to convert authentic messages into others with high probability of passing Bob's test. In the simple case we are dealing with (only classical messages of one bit), this implies converting |φ 0 into |φ 1 and vice versa.
In order to simplify the analysis and without loss of generality, we can classify Eve's possible manipulations in two different types. The first one is based on applying a trace-preserving completely positive (TPCP) map on the state in the channel, whereas the second corresponds to the possible measurement of the state in the channel and the appropriate post-preparation of messages based on the information gained by the measurement.
Eve performs a TPCP map
Consider that Alice sends to Bob a quantum message |φ i , with i ∈ {0, 1}, and Eve performs an arbitrary TPCP map, M, on it. The new state in the channel is ρ ′ E = M(ρ ′ ), with ρ ′ given by (3) . In order to achieve a probability of successful tampering equal to one Eve needs to choose M such that the decoding procedure performed by Bob on the resulting state lead to the state |φ j , with j ∈ {0, 1}, and j = i. Owing to the pure character of the states |φ 0 and |φ 1 , this can only be possible if the TPCP is a unitary operation U E . For this kind of operation the probability of tampering the state |φ i , P t (i), is φ j |ρ ′′ E |φ j , where ρ ′′ E , Bob's decoded state, is
where ρ i = |φ i φ i |. Therefore,
If Alice prepares the state |φ i with probability p i , the overall probability of, employing a TPCP, substitute an authentic message with a different one that passes Bob's test is i p i P t (i). Assuming, for simplicity, and without loss of generality, equal probabilities, Eve can achieve undetected tampering with certainty if and only if P t (0) = P t (1) = 1. According to equation (10) this requires U E to simultaneously satisfy, up to arbitrary global phase factors, the following two pairs of conditions:
and
∀ i, j ∈ {0, 1}, with i = j. The orthogonality between |φ 0 and |φ 1 allows Eve to always fulfill one of the two pairs of conditions independently of the particular U E employed by Alice and Bob. Without loss of generality, assume that Eve selects U E such that (11) is satisfied. This selection makes U E to have, in the orthonormal base {|φ i ; i = 0, . . . , 3}, the following block representation:
with M E 0 = e iα S(β)σ x , where α is an arbitrary phase, σ x is the standard Pauli matrix, and S(β) is a phase-shift operation, whose matrix representation is:
and M E 1 is any 2 × 2 unitary matrix. Now, if we further demand the fulfillment of (12), the matrix elements of U E and U E must obey φ k |U E |φ i = 3 l=0 φ k |U E |φ φ l |U E |φ j ∀k ∈ {0, . . . , 3}. With the notation of U E introduced in equation (13) represents the j-column of the i-block of U E , must satisfy
, where γ, δ and χ are such that U E is a unitary operation. If Alice and Bob choose U E such that all these requirements are not verified, then the probability of successful forgery will be strictly less than one independently of Eve's TPCP map.
Eve measures the channel
Let us assume now that, instead of performing a TPCP map, Eve measures the state on the channel and tries to take advantage of the information gain in order to substitute |φ 0 with |φ 1 and vice versa. The purpose of such attack is to obtain Alice's message and destroy the entanglement created in the encoding process, thus collapsing Alice and Bob qubits of the key in a known pure quantum state. If Eve manages to do it, she will be able to throw away Alice's message and prepare and send to Bob a false one that will pass his test perfectly. In order to avoid the success of this kind of forgery, Alice and Bob must choose U E such that, independently of Eve's measurement strategy, it must be impossible to infer Alice's qubit state with certainty. This can be accomplished if the states {|φ i , U E |φ i }, with i = 0, 1 are not orthogonal. Owing to the orthogonality of |φ 0 and |φ 1 , this requirement can be rewritten as φ i |U E |φ j = 0 for, at least, one i and j, with i, j ∈ {0, 1}. Note that if φ i |U E |φ j = 0, with i = j, there is also a probability, strictly greater than one, of Eve not determining which message Alice sent. With the block notation above, this condition can be expressed as |M 0 0 | > 0 or |M 1 0 | > 0.
Discussion
In this section we have analyzed several types of attacks, which we believe are the most powerful ones, against the message authentication protocol proposed in Section 3. We have shown that, in order to avoid tampering strategies, Alice and Bob should choose U E such that the following conditions are satisfied:
Therefore, two questions arise: (i) Can a unitary operation simultaneously fulfill all these restrictions? and, (ii) If the answer is yes, what is the optimum U E ? Perhaps the easiest way to answer the first question is with a trivial example. If, for instance,M 0 0 = (0.5 0.5) andM 0 0 = (0 0), it is straightforward to construct a unitary operation with its first block equal to M 0 . Moreover, it is evident that all the above conditions are satisfied by this matrix. As for the second question, it is an important open issue that we plan to address in the future. It is the natural way to proceed in order to give strict bounds on the probability of success of Eve's strategies.
Finally, one interesting property of this quantum authentication protocol is that it provides the possibility of reusing the authentication keys. However, the security of the protocol when the key is reused requires a careful analysis. If there is no tampering, then after Alice's encoding and Bob's decoding processes the state of the key remains intact. Thus, if the authentication procedure success, in principle Alice and Bob could retain the ebit key and reuse it in the next time. But the presence of Eve can not be despised. Eve could try to entangle an ancilla system with the quantum authentication key in the following way:
with |φ ABE ∈ K ⊗ A, where K, A denote the state spaces of the key and the ancilla systems, respectively, and |φ E and |φ ⊥ E represent two arbitrary orthonormal states in A. If equation (15) is verified, Eve could always forge messages when the key is reused, just reproducing Alice's encoding process, but employing her ancilla as the control of the quantum operation. Let us assume that Eve has access only to the quantum channel between Alice and Bob, which we believe is a reasonable assumption. In order to entangle her ancilla and the key, Eve needs to perform simultaneously a successful message authentication step. Note that if the authentication fails, the parties discard all particles used until that instant. As we have seen, if Eve prepares a quantum message and sends it to Bob, with U E satisfying the above conditions, the success of the authentication process is not guaranteed. Therefore, Eve cannot determine when she achieves the task. Another possibility consists in trying to take advantage of a valid message. This strategy must not be confused with the one previously analyzed when dealing with TPCP maps. Now Eve does not need to convert |φ 0 into |φ 1 and vice versa. She can prepare |ψ E ∈ A and apply a unitary operation U E⊗A of the form:
trying to achieve U E⊗A (|φ i |ψ E ) = (α|φ i +β|φ j )|φ E and U E⊗A (U E |φ i |ψ E ) = (γU E |φ i +δU E |φ j )|φ ⊥ E , with i, j ∈ {0, 1}, and α, β, γ, δ some complex parameters such that |α| 2 + |β| 2 = |γ| 2 + |δ| 2 = 1. If U E is chosen such that |M 0 0 | > 0 or |M 1 0 | > 0, then it is guaranteed that |φ i and U E |φ i are not orthogonal for at least one value of i. Therefore, and since the inner product of states is preserved by any unitary operation, these conditions are impossible to fulfill. This means that equation (15) cannot be achieved with certainty.
The security of key recycling in our protocol, as suggested in [30] , depends on the possibility to detect Eve's presence in the quantum ciphertext. As we have seen, our protocol can detect Eve with a certain probability. Therefore, there is a chance that Eve remains undetected, and then, if the key is reused, the security of the protocol may be drastically reduced.
Conclusion
We have presented a quantum authentication protocol that, making use of just one ebit as the authentication key, allows the authentication of classical messages in a secure manner. The security of the protocol does not depend on keeping classical information secret, including information about quantum states. Besides, all parties, including the forger, have full information about all aspects of the protocol. We have described several types of possible attacks and shown that careful selection of the quantum operations performed by the communicating parties makes the protocol secure against these attacks. Finally, we have also shown that the protocol authentication keys can be reused. However, this reduces the security of the protocol.
